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Abstract
The nine Bradford Hill (BH) viewpoints (sometimes referred to as criteria) are commonly used to assess causality within 
epidemiology. However, causal thinking has since developed, with three of the most prominent approaches implicitly or 
explicitly building on the potential outcomes framework: directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), sufficient-component cause models 
(SCC models, also referred to as ‘causal pies’) and the grading of recommendations, assessment, development and evaluation 
(GRADE) methodology. This paper explores how these approaches relate to BH’s viewpoints and considers implications 
for improving causal assessment. We mapped the three approaches above against each BH viewpoint. We found overlap 
across the approaches and BH viewpoints, underscoring BH viewpoints’ enduring importance. Mapping the approaches 
helped elucidate the theoretical underpinning of each viewpoint and articulate the conditions when the viewpoint would 
be relevant. Our comparisons identified commonality on four viewpoints: strength of association (including analysis of 
plausible confounding); temporality; plausibility (encoded by DAGs or SCC models to articulate mediation and interaction, 
respectively); and experiments (including implications of study design on exchangeability). Consistency may be more use-
fully operationalised by considering an effect size’s transportability to a different population or unexplained inconsistency 
in effect sizes (statistical heterogeneity). Because specificity rarely occurs, falsification exposures or outcomes (i.e., nega-
tive controls) may be more useful. The presence of a dose-response relationship may be less than widely perceived as it can 
easily arise from confounding. We found limited utility for coherence and analogy. This study highlights a need for greater 
clarity on BH viewpoints to improve causal assessment.
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Introduction
Causal assessment is fundamental to epidemiology as it may 
inform policy and practice to improve population health. A 
leading figure in epidemiology, Sir Austin Bradford Hill, 
suggested the goal of causal assessment is to understand if 
there is “any other way of explaining the set of facts before 
us … any other answer equally, or more, likely than cause 
and effect” [1]. Causal assessment may be applied to a body 
of evidence or a single study to interrogate the “set of facts” 
underlying a relationship. Bradford Hill notably laid out a 
set of such facts. Although commonly described as Bradford 
Hill criteria, he described them as ‘viewpoints’ and empha-
sised they should not be used as a checklist, but as considera-
tions for assessing causality. As a result, we refer to them as 
‘BH viewpoints’ [2].
Since Bradford Hill first introduced his viewpoints, causal 
thinking in epidemiology has increasingly incorporated the 
potential outcomes framework [3–8]. Informally, the poten-
tial outcomes framework posits that a true causal effect is 
the difference between the observed outcome when the indi-
vidual was exposed and the unobserved potential outcome 
had the individual not been exposed, all other things being 
equal [6]. Because the unobserved potential outcome of an 
individual cannot be known, investigators often compare the 
outcomes of exposed and unexposed groups [6]. Application 
of the potential outcomes framework asks investigators to 
consider exchangeability between these groups i.e., if the 
unexposed group would have the same risk of the outcome 
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as the exposed group had they also been exposed [6]. In 
practice, this means considering if groups are comparable. 
Investigators may be more confident that the observed effect 
equals the true causal effect if the groups are exchangeable 
[9].
We focus on three approaches that implicitly or explicitly 
incorporate the potential outcomes framework but opera-
tionalise it differently [4, 10–12]. Firstly, directed acyclic 
graphs (DAGs) help articulate assumptions about the inter-
relationships between variables of interest and therefore 
threats to valid causal inference. Sufficient-component cause 
(SCC) models highlight the multi-factorial nature of causal-
ity, drawing attention to how different exposures interact to 
produce the outcome. Finally, the Grading of Recommenda-
tions, Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) 
methodology provides a systematic approach to assessing 
the certainty of a causal relationship based on a body of 
evidence (i.e., the existing studies available used to assess 
whether a causal relationship between an exposure and out-
come exists). Epidemiologists have proposed that causal 
assessment may be improved by combining approaches such 
as these [7, 13–15].
To draw on the strengths of each of these potential out-
comes framework approaches, we compared the extent to 
which they overlap or complement each other. There is lim-
ited literature comparing the potential outcomes framework 
in SCC models and DAGs [4, 5, 11] and one study compar-
ing BH viewpoints to GRADE [10]. While BH viewpoints 
have been revisited to critically reflect on the theory and 
application of each viewpoint [2, 16–20], we have not identi-
fied any attempts to compare it to DAGs and SCC models, 
with the former particularly important given the growing 
influence of DAGs in epidemiology [21].
Our main aims are to examine: 1) if and how each BH 
viewpoint is considered by each of the three potential 
outcomes framework approaches (referred to simply as 
‘approaches’ hereafter); and 2) the extent they elucidate the 
underpinning theory of BH viewpoints. BH viewpoints serve 
as the foundation for this comparison because of its influen-
tial status within epidemiology [19, 20, 22]. Additionally, 
there is agreement in the literature that the BH viewpoints 
account for the most relevant considerations in causal assess-
ment [17]. To facilitate comparisons, we drew DAGs and 
SCC models for each BH viewpoint and mapped each BH 
viewpoint against each GRADE domain. We use the exam-
ple of alcohol consumption and active-tuberculosis where 
relevant to illustrate the elements of each approach. Myco-
bacterium tuberculosis (MTB) is the bacterium responsible 
for tuberculosis (TB). MTB causes latent-TB, which can turn 
into active-TB in individuals with low immunity [23]. Alco-
hol consumption is hypothesised to cause a weaker immune 
system, resulting in active-TB [24]. The example is purpose-
fully simplified and may not reflect real-world scenarios.
In the next section, we summarise the BH viewpoints and 
key characteristics of the three approaches they are being 
compared against. Our aim is to introduce the commonalities 
and distinctions within these approaches as approaches to 
causal inference, rather than to provide a detailed explana-
tion or critical assessment of each approach. Following this, 
we compare each of the nine BH viewpoints against the three 
approaches and critically reflect on the theoretical implica-
tions for assessing causal relationships. We finish by sum-
marising our key findings, make tentative suggestions about 
how causal assessment could be conducted in the future and 
note some areas for future research.
Causal assessment approaches
Bradford Hill viewpoints
Bradford Hill’s explanation of the nine viewpoints is sum-
marised in Table 1. These were not intended to be “hard and 
fast rules of evidence that must be obeyed before we accept 
cause and effect,” but characteristics to keep in mind while 
considering if an observed association is due to something 
other than causality [1]. In current practice, BH viewpoints 
are applied together or separately to a body of evidence or a 
single empirical study.
Directed acyclic graphs
DAGs are diagrams that illustrate the putative causal rela-
tionship between an exposure and outcome [6]. DAGs 
include the variables that might bias the relationship in ques-
tion and their development is based on background knowl-
edge of the topic [25]. Detailed explanations of DAGs can be 
found elsewhere [5, 6, 25–27]. DAGs are commonly applied 
to a single study, but it has been proposed that they can be 
applied to a body of evidence [62].
The simplified DAG below (Fig. 1) shows the pathway 
between the exposure and outcome, alcohol consumption 
and active-TB, respectively. Alcohol consumption may 
result in active-TB, for example, by lowering an individual’s 
immune system (mediator not shown) [23]. Overcrowding 
is a confounding variable, causing both alcohol consump-
tion and active-TB. If there was no causal effect of alco-
hol consumption on active-TB (i.e. no edge between those 
two variables in the DAG), an association would still be 
observed between them in the data due to the common cause 
overcrowding [4, 25, 28, 29]. Thus, overcrowding must be 
conditioned upon, indicated by a square around the vari-
able, to obtain an unbiased estimate of alcohol consumption 
on active-TB. If investigators condition on the appropriate 
variables using a DAG that accurately represents a causal 
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relationship, they may be more confident of exchangeability 
and thus estimating the true causal effect [9, 30].
Sufficient‑component cause (SCC) models
SCC models (also known as causal pies) illustrate the multi-
factorial nature of causality through pie charts [31]. SCC 
models view each of the variables that contribute to the 
outcome occurring as causal components [32], with many 
different combinations of components potentially bringing 
about the outcome of interest. Taken together, the compo-
nents for each ‘complete pie’ are sufficient to produce the 
outcome. Necessary components are those without which 
the outcome could not occur [33]. For example, MTB is a 
necessary (but insufficient) component of tuberculosis and 
will therefore be a component for all of the causal pies for 
tuberculosis (but never features as a sole component of a 
causal pie). The origins of SCC models can be traced to 
Mackie’s definition of causality. This introduced the idea of 
INUS causation, that is a cause can be “an insufficient but 
necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but 
sufficient for the result” [34] p. 45.
Causal pies are useful for understanding causal mecha-
nisms and interactions of causal components [33]. Table 2 
illustrates four pies (S1, S2, S3, S4) for two different popula-
tions (population 1 and population 2) which represent the 
possible combination of selected causal components (alco-
hol, overcrowding and unknown factors) for the development 
of active TB.
GRADE methodology
GRADE is the most widely adopted approach for assess-
ing certainty of evidence in systematic reviews, guideline 
development and evidence-informed recommendations 
[35]. Certainty has been defined by the GRADE Working 
Group as the “extent of our confidence that the estimates 
of the effect are correct” [10, 36–38]. Certainty is based 
Table 1  Bradford Hill viewpoints and explanatory quotations
Viewpoint Explanatory quotations from Bradford Hill [1]
Strength of association “But to explain the pronounced excess in cancer of the lung [among cigarette smokers] in any other environmental 
terms requires some feature of life so intimately linked with cigarette smoking and with the amount of smoking that 
such a feature should be easily detectable.” p. 296
Consistency “We have, therefore, the somewhat paradoxical position that the different results of a different inquiry certainly cannot 
be held to refute the original evidence; yet the same results from precisely the same form of inquiry will not invari-
ably greatly strengthen the original evidence. I would myself put a good deal of weight upon similar results reached 
in quite different ways, e.g. prospectively and retrospectively.” p. 296–297
Specificity “If, as here, the association [between working as a nickel refiner and cancer] is limited to specific workers and to 
particular sites and types of disease and there is no association between the work and other modes of dying, then 
clearly that is a strong argument in favour of causation. We must not, however, over-emphasize the importance of the 
characteristic [specificity].” p. 297
Temporality “Which is the cart and which the horse? This is a question which might be particularly relevant with diseases of slow 
development.” p. 297
Dose-response “For instance, the fact that the death rate from cancer of the lung rises linearly with the number of cigarettes smoked 
daily, adds a very great deal to the simpler evidence that cigarette smokers have a higher death rate than non-smok-
ers.” p. 298
Plausibility “But this is a feature I am convinced we cannot demand. What is biologically plausible depends upon the biological 
knowledge of the day.” p. 298
Coherence “On the other hand, the cause-and-effect interpretation of our data should not seriously conflict with the generally 
known facts of the natural history and biology of the disease.” p. 298
Experiment “Occasionally it is possible to appeal to experimental, or semi-experimental, evidence. For example, because of an 
observed association some preventive action is taken. Does it in fact prevent? The dust in the workshop is reduced, 
lubricating oils are changed, persons stop smoking cigarettes. Is the frequency of the associated events affected? 
Here the strongest support for the causation hypothesis may be revealed.” p. 298–299
Analogy “In some circumstances it would be fair to judge by analogy. With the effects of thalidomide and rubella before us we 





Fig. 1  Directed acyclic graph representing relationship between 
alcohol consumption and active-TB. The confounding variable, over-
crowding, effects both the exposure and outcome and should be con-
ditioned on, as indicated by the bold square around overcrowding
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both on assessing the risk of bias of individual studies and 
an evaluation across studies [35]. GRADE typically con-
siders evidence from randomised controlled trials (RCTs) 
as providing a higher level of certainty than evidence from 
nonrandomised studies (NRSs), although the appropriate-
ness of this has been critiqued [39]. Certainty may be modi-
fied according to different GRADE domains (summarised 
in Table 3). Large associations, dose-response relationships 
and adjusting for plausible confounding upgrade certainty.
Comparisons against Bradford Hill’s 
viewpoints
Table  4 summarises the overlapping elements between 
BH viewpoints and the potential outcomes framework 
approaches, with subsequent text providing additional detail.
Strength of association
Bradford Hill argued that a large association suggests the 
observed effect is less likely to be due to bias [1, 40], but 
he acknowledged that weak (or small) associations may still 
reflect causal relationships. As noted by Greenland and Rob-
ins, large associations can still arise from confounding and 
a weak association does not mean there is an absence of 
causality[33]. In practice, investigators may rely on existing 
tools and guidelines, or their own interpretation, to deter-
mine what constitutes a strong association.
Although DAGs cannot represent the size of an associa-
tion, they facilitate “bias analysis” (see Fig. 1) [14]. Investi-
gators may use DAGs to highlight important variables that 
they were unable to condition on and consider their implica-
tions for the effect estimate, including residual confounding 
(from inaccurately or poorly measured variables, including 
confounders) [41].
SCC models draw attention to the impact of disease prev-
alence and the prevalence of competing causes on the strenth 
of association or effect estimate. For example, the RR of 
 S3 is attenuated as the prevalence of a competing sufficient 
cause  (S4) or the prevalence of the outcome in the reference 
group  (S1) increases (see Table 2).
According to the GRADE Working Group, a strong asso-
ciation is indicated by a risk ratio (RR) of 2–5 or 0.2–0.5 
Table 3  The initial level of certainty, according to GRADE, differs between randomised controlled trials (RCTs) and nonrandomised studies 
(NRSs)
The level of certainty indicates the confidence of investigators that the estimated effect is close to the true causal effect. GRADE provides 
domains that may upgrade or downgrade the level of certainty. Based on tables in [38]
Concerns about directness, inconsistency, imprecision and publication bias may reduce certainty. Directness refers to how closely the research 
evidence relates to the research question of interest, with different study populations (such as available evidence only focusing on adults, rather 
than children) or the use of surrogate outcomes being examples of ‘indirectness’. Inconsistency reflects differences in the effect size across stud-
ies (often identified through high levels of heterogeneity in a meta-analysis) which cannot be adequately explained. Imprecision occurs when 
effect estimates have wide confidence interval. Publication bias may arise if studies with a positive or exciting result are more likely to be pub-
lished than those without a large association
Type of evidence cor-
responding to initial level 
of certainty




plus: ⊕ ⊕  ⊕ ⊕)
We are very confident that the true effect lies close to that of the estimate of the effect
Moderate (three 
plus: ⊕  ⊕  ⊕ ○)
We are moderately confident in the effect estimate: The true effect is likely to be close to 
the estimate of the effect, but there is a possibility that it is substantially different
Nonrandomised studies 
(NRSs)
Low (two plus: ⊕  ⊕ ○○) Our confidence in the effect estimate is limited: The true effect may be substantially dif-
ferent from the estimate of the effect
Very low (one 
plus: ⊕ ○○○)
We have very little confidence in the effect estimate: The true effect is likely to be sub-
stantially different from the estimate of effect
Domains that may downgrade or upgrade (for observational evidence) a level of certainty
Downgrade Large effect
 + 1 Large
 + 2 Very large
Dose response
 + 1 Evidence of a gradi-
ent
All plausible residual 
confounding would:
 + 1 reduce a demon-
strated effect
 + 1 suggest a spurious 
effect if no effect was 
observed
Upgrade Risk of Bias
 − 1 Serious
 − 2 Very serious
Inconsistency
 − 1 Serious
 − 2 Very serious
Indirectness
 − 1 Serious
 − 2 Very serious
Imprecision
 − 1 Serious
 − 2 Very serious
Publication bias
 − 1 Likely
 − 2 Very likely
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[17, 17, 17]. Evidence from NRSs that estimate a large effect 
will be upgraded on the basis that confounding is less likely 
to entirely remove the observed association [43].
Consistency
Bradford Hill argued that consistent estimates observed in 
different circumstances reduce the likelihood that the effect 
is due to chance or bias [1]. Comparison with the three 
approaches demonstrate that differences in effect size across 
studies which may be due to variations in causal structures, 
variable interactions, or biases of the relevant studies.
Transportability refers to the extent to which a causal 
effect in one context can be used to infer a causal effect 
in different circumstances, such as different populations or 
study designs [44]. Investigators can use DAGs to under-
stand how differences in causal structures may explain dif-
ferent observed effect sizes. For example, investigators may 
want to understand if the causal effect of alcohol consump-
tion on active-TB can be extrapolated to a target population 
with a high baseline risk of HIV (represented in Fig. 2). 
In other words, to understand if the different effect size in 
the target population is due to HIV modifying the effect of 
alcohol consumption on active-TB by reducing immunity 
[45, 46]. To represent the target population’s exposure to a 
stratum of HIV (i.e., a higher risk of HIV), there is a square 
around HIV [44, 46]. If the likelihood of active-TB for a 
given level of alcohol consumption is equivalent between 
the populations, the estimated effect of alcohol on active-TB 
is transportable and any statistical heterogeneity observed 
is likely due to HIV risk modifying the effect of alcohol on 
active-TB[46].
Investigators can use SCC models to understand differ-
ences in variable interactions and if that can explain differ-
ent observed effect sizes observed between populations [44, 
47–49]. For example, investigators may want to understand 
if the RR of individuals in population 1 in Table 2 can be 
transported to population 2. According to Table 2, the RR of 
active-TB when individuals are exposed only to overcrowd-
ing  (S3) is lower in population 2 than population 1. i.e., the 
effect of overcrowding on active-TB differs between popu-
lations when alcohol is not consumed. It may be that the 
unknown factors of  S3 differ between populations. However, 
because the RRs are the same for other causal pies, investi-
gators may assume that the reason for different prevalence 
and RRs for  S3 is that unknown factors and overcrowding 
are interacting differently between the populations, in which 
case the effect sizes cannot be transported from population 
1 to population 2.
In GRADE, unexplained inconsistency (typically, sta-
tistical heterogeneity) suggests lower confidence about the 
likely effect of the exposure under different circumstances. 
GRADE considers unexplained inconsistency rather than 
consistent effect estimates, as Bradford Hill suggested, to 
highlight that consistent estimates in different circumstances 
may be subject to the same bias and do not necessarily 
increase confidence in causality [50].
Specificity
According to Bradford Hill, a relationship is specific if the 
exposure is associated with the outcome in question and no 
others, and if the outcome is associated with the exposure 
in question and no others. He emphasised that a non-specific 
relationship does not undermine causality. Specificity origi-
nated in Robert Koch’s postulates to evaluate causality in 
infectious diseases, but is rare in epidemiology and usually 
arises when the outcome is defined based on the exposure 
status (e.g., tuberculosis being defined by the presence of the 
tubercle bacillus) [17, 51, 52]. Comparisons highlighted how 
multiple causation (where one exposure may affect many 
outcomes and one outcome may be effected by many expo-
sures) limits the utility of directly applying specificity in 
epidemiological practice, but extending the concept to the 
related idea of ‘falsification’ may improve its usefulness.
The DAG in Fig. 1 illustrates a non-specific relationship 
as active-TB is caused by at least two exposures: alcohol-
consumption and overcrowding [53]. The relationship is 
also non-specific because alcohol consumption may cause 
many other outcomes such as cancer, cardiovascular disease 
and injuries [54]. This is not shown in the DAG in Fig. 1 
because DAGs typically include the main variables related 
to the relationship of interest (i.e., an exposure, outcome and 
any potential confounders) [55]. This is also the reason why 
DAGs are not used to demonstrate specific relationships; a 
variable may be left out of a DAG because it is not of inter-






Fig. 2  Directed acyclic graph (DAG) of target population with high 
baseline risk of HIV. The high baseline risk of HIV means that HIV 
has been conditioned upon, indicated by square around HIV. The esti-
mated effect of alcohol consumption on active-TB in this population 
will be  modified by the higher risk of HIV. This needs to be consid-
ered when comparing the effect estimates between this target popula-
tion and the one described in Fig. 1 with low risk of HIV
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One important reason for specificity is multiple causation 
suggests a higher likelihood that the observed association is 
due to confounding. Rather than seeking evidence of speci-
ficity, DAGs can be used to help identify and assess falsifica-
tion (or negative control) outcomes and exposures. A falsi-
fication outcome is expected to be both independent of the 
outcome and associated with the exposure only through the 
confounding variable [56]. If investigators accurately condi-
tion on the confounding variable, they would not observe an 
effect of the exposure on the falsification outcome.
A hypothetical falsification outcome is head lice (Fig. 3). 
Alcohol consumption does not have a causal effect on head 
lice. If investigators observe an effect of alcohol consump-
tion on head lice despite conditioning upon overcrowding, 
this is likely due to residual confounding due to overcrowd-
ing being inaccurately measured. Therefore, it is possible 
that the relationship between alcohol and active-TB is also 
subject to residual confounding of overcrowding and inves-
tigators should adjust their conclusions accordingly. An 
absence of association between alcohol consumption and 
head lice does not suggest specificity, but investigators may 
be more confident that in this study, the association between 
alcohol consumption and active-TB is not confounded by 
overcrowding.
Finding falsification variables can be challenging. Take 
the example of identifying a falsification exposure (which 
is independent of the exposure and associated with the out-
come only through the confounding variable). Many possible 
exposures associated with the confounder (overcrowding), 
such as smoking, air pollution, experiences of homeless-
ness and malnutrition are also associated with the outcome 
(active-TB) and therefore would fail as a falsification expo-
sure [57, 58]. Put another way, the lack of specificity in most 
causal relationships in epidemiology limits our ability to 
carry out falsification tests. However, where they do exist 
they can offer a powerful tool for assessing bias.
Causal pies illustrate the multi-factorial nature of causal 
relationship that limits the likelihood of specificity because 
a range of causal pies (and causal components) may produce 
the same outcome (see Table 2). One causal pie may also 
be used to represent a possible sufficient-cause for various 
exposures[59]. The causal pie would represent a specific 
relationship only if a component is both necessary and suf-
ficient to produce the outcome and the outcome could only 
be produced by this necessary and sufficient cause [31, 33]. 
These limitations are among the reasons why some, includ-
ing the originators of GRADE methodology, argue that 
specificity should be excluded from causal assessment [7, 
10, 31, 60].
Temporality
Temporality is considered fundamental to causality; an 
exposure must precede an outcome. Bradford Hill alluded 
to how reverse causality skews temporality: “does a particu-
lar occupation or occupational environment promote infec-
tion by the tubercle bacillus … or, indeed, have they already 
contracted it?” [1]. Two of the three approaches explicitly 
incorporate temporality, with the order of cause and effect 
being fundamental to DAGs.
DAGs can highlight reverse causality [20, 61]. For exam-
ple, in a cross-sectional study, the observed effect of alco-
hol consumption is based on measurements after individuals 
were diagnosed with active-TB. However, active-TB may 
have actually occurred prior to diagnosis of active-TB and 
been a cause of alcohol consumption, via social marginali-
sation [62]. Given a longitudinal study that has information 
on previous diagnoses, investigators could test for reverse 
causation by considering if active-TB was present before the 
diagnosis that was observed after alcohol consumption (see 
Fig. 4). If investigators conditioned upon active-TB before 
diagnosis and continued to observe an effect of consuming 
alcohol on active-TB after diagnosis, or if they found no 
effect of active-TB before diagnosis on alcohol consumption, 
then the estimated effect of alcohol consumption on active-





Fig. 3  The directed acyclic graphs (DAG) shows the relationship 
between the exposure (alcohol consumption), the outcome (active-
TB), the confounding variable (overcrowding) and the falsification 
outcome (head lice). The bold square around overcrowding indicates 
that it has been conditioned on. If there is no effect of alcohol con-
sumption on head lice, there is a greater likelihood that overcrowding 




Fig. 4  Temporality using directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). Investiga-
tors may be more confident that the effect of alcohol consumption on 
active-TB is not due to reverse causality if (1) they condition upon 
active-TB before diagnosis and continue to observe an effect of alco-
hol consumption on active-TB after diagnosis or (2) if they do not 
observe an effect of active-TB before diagnosis on alcohol consump-
tion
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Time may be one component of a causal pie but temporal-
ity is not considered in the synergy, antagonism and inter-
action of the components [2]. Temporality is not directly 
considered by GRADE. RCTs, which guarantee that the 
exposure precedes the outcome through study design, are 
upgraded. However, the favouring of RCTs is not only about 
temporality but also about the achievement of exchangeabil-
ity through randomisation. Additionally temporality is not 
explicitly considered for NRSs (which include longitudinal 
studies and so may also be able to ensure that the exposure 
precedes the outcome).([10].
Dose‑response
A dose-response gradient exists when incremental increases 
(or decreases) of the exposure produce incremental increases 
(or decreases) of the outcome. Dose-response is fundamental 
to causal assessment in pharmacology and toxicology [63]. 
Bradford Hill argued that a dose-response gradient provides 
a “simpler explanation” of the causal relationship than if 
it were not observed (see Table 1) [1]. However, there are 
many reasons investigators may not observe a dose-response 
gradient including exposure threshold effects, as in the case 
of allergens [17]. Furthermore, a dose-response relation-
ship may be induced by a confounding variable [64, 65]. 
For example, an incremental increase in alcohol consump-
tion that corresponds to an incremental increase in active-TB 
may be due to incremental increases in overcrowding (see 
Fig. 1) [66]. While DAGs non-parametric (and so cannot 
show the structure of the relationship between any two vari-
ables), they can be used to consider the plausibility of one 
or more confounding variables undermining a dose-response 
relationship.
Unknown components limit the utility of SCC models 
to assess dose-response gradients. Evidence from NRSs is 
upgraded in GRADE if a dose-response relationship has 
been observed on the basis that confounding is less likely 
[35]. However, as noted above, a dose-response relationship 
may easily arise from confounding.
Plausibility
Investigators develop assumptions about a causal relation-
ship based on background knowledge. Thus, the plausibility 
of the causal relationship is both dependent on and limited 
by knowledge available at the time [1]. It may be further 
limited by assumptions based on investigators’ beliefs rather 
than empirical evidence [67].
The process of developing DAGs and SCC models forces 
investigators to explicitly articulate assumptions about the 
causal relationships relevant to the research question of 
interest, making it transparent to other investigators [44, 
68] [69]. DAGs may include mediators, which lie on the 
causal path between the exposure and outcome; a weakened 
immunity is the mediator by which alcohol consumption 
causes active-TB. Mediation analysis considers the direct 
and indirect effect of mediators [70]. Interrogating back-
ground knowledge to develop a DAG encourages a more 
systematic exploration of the plausibility of the causal chain.
For SCC models, investigators make explicit the nature of 
variable interaction [71]. GRADE upgrades for appropriate 
adjustment for all plausible confounding variables, but does 
not consider the broader variables relevant to the plausibil-
ity of a causal relationship across a body of evidence [35].
Coherence
Coherence is an assessment of how the putative relationship 
fits into existing theory and empirical evidence [1, 60]. Our 
comparisons suggest that coherence is not considered by the 
other approaches and may have limited utility, partly because 
it is poorly delineated from plausibility [72]. Investigators 
evaluating the coherence of a DAG or SCC model may con-
sider how the assumptions illustrated by either approach 
fit existing theory, however, neither consider or illustrate 
coherence. Schünemann and colleagues argue that GRADE 
considers coherence by assessing indirectness [10]. How-
ever, in considering indirectness, investigators determine 
how applicable the population and interventions of iden-
tified studies are to the putative causal relationship under 
study. Coherence, on the other hand, asks investigators to 
consider how applicable the putative causal relationship is 
to broader evidence, including studies that do not investigate 
that specific relationship.
Experiment
Bradford Hill argued that “strong support for the causa-
tion hypothesis might be revealed” from “experimental, or 
semi-experimental data” [1]. He alluded to natural experi-
ment studies, where the exposure is determined by nature 
or other factors outside of the control of investigators and 
where exchangeability between comparison groups is more 
likely [29].
Investigators have used DAGs to elucidate why randomi-
sation results in exchangeability. Randomisation is an exam-
ple of an instrumental variable; it causes (and is not caused 
Assessing causality in epidemiology: revisiting Bradford Hill to incorporate developments…
1 3
by) the exposure and only impacts the outcome through the 
exposure [73]. If consuming alcohol was completely ran-
dom and randomisation was independent of active-TB (see 
Fig. 5), the risk of overcrowding would be the same for indi-
viduals allocated to consume alcohol and those allocated 
to not [74]. Thus, the effect estimated would be based on 
exchangeable groups, but bounded by the proportion of indi-
viduals exposed due to randomisation, potentially limiting 
the transportability of the effect estimate [44, 75].
Due to limitations on randomisation, epidemiologists rely 
largely on observational data. Investigators can use DAGs to 
interrogate the plausibility of “naturally occurring” instrumen-
tal variables, and how likely it is that individuals were truly 
randomly exposed [29, 73]. Clarity about study design, par-
ticularly procedures for assigning exposure, has been assisted 
by DAGs through the development of the ‘target trial’ (or 
‘emulated trial’) where observational data analysis emulates 
randomised trial data analysis [76]. While it has several advan-
tages, this does not seem to be directly comparable with the 
original BH viewpoint.
The causal pies that result in a given disease include both 
known and unknown components, as shown in Table 2. As 
investigators are unable to measure unknown variables for 
each causal pie, they cannot be certain that the groups exposed 
to each causal pie are exchangeable because they may differ in 
other characteristics that affect the outcome [4, 11]. GRADE 
privileges effect estimates from randomised (experimental) 
studies which are more likely to be “causally attributable to the 
intervention” by initially grading RCTs higher than NRSs [43]. 
At present, no distinction is made between natural experiment 
studies and other NRSs on the basis of study design.
Analogy
Bradford Hill argued that the likelihood of a causal rela-
tionship may be strengthened if a comparable association is 
observed between the same outcome and an analogous expo-
sure or the same exposure and an analogous outcome. DAGs 
and SCC models do not account for analogous relationships 
in their assessment, but analogous relationships may be part 
of developing the assumptions and theories encoded in the 
diagrams. In GRADE, downgrading would be prevented if 
there was certainty in a causal relationship between the same 
exposure and similar outcomes in the same body of evidence 
[10]. While this has been conflated with analogy, this is more 
to do with the directness of the evidence to the research ques-
tion rather than the transportability of the assumptions of an 
analogous, confirmed causal relationship to the one under 
study [77].
Discussion and conclusions
Epidemiologists evaluate evidence to understand how 
likely it is the observed effect is equal to the causal effect. 
We mapped DAGs, SCC models and GRADE against 
each BH viewpoint by comparing each tool to identify the 
overlap between different perspectives on causal assess-
ment. The summary of these comparisons and the poten-
tial implications for causal assessment can be found in 
Table 5.
The comparisons highlight the overlap between BH 
viewpoints and other approaches. This underscores the 
ongoing influence of BH viewpoints in causal assess-
ment alongside developments in causal thinking. It also 
highlights the importance of other approaches in under-
standing BH viewpoints. DAGs help explain the theoreti-
cal underpinning of strength of association, consistency, 
temporality, specificity, dose-response, plausibility, and 
experiment. GRADE provides guidance on how causal 
assessment can be applied in practice, particularly for 
considering strength of association, consistency, tempo-
rality, dose-response and experiment. While the inclusion 
of SCC models can be debated as they can be considered a 
framework to describe causal reality and are least used of 
the approaches we studied, their inclusion has been useful 
for understanding strength of association and plausibility 
in our analysis. Despite their seemingly limited utility for 
understanding BH viewpoints, SCC models, along with 
GRADE, also help explain why specificity may have lim-
ited usefulness in causal inference.
Our analysis is the first to compare insights from 
advancements in causal assessment with BH viewpoints 




Fig. 5  Directed acyclic graph (DAG) with randomisation as the instrumental variable. According to this DAG, randomisation causes alcohol 
consumption. If this were true, there is a greater likelihood that the effect estimated would be similar or equivalent to the true causal effect
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hope our study will encourage debate and discussion 
on overlapping approaches to causal inference. Further 
research and discussion is necessary to develop a new 
and comprehensive set of causal criteria that incorpo-
rates both traditional and recently developed approaches 
in causal inference. Such work would likely benefit from 
applying these different approaches to specific research 
questions, with a view to identifying their relative capac-
ity to facilitate causal assessment. However, we did not 
critique the individual approaches as this has been done 
in previous works [4, 5, 10, 11]. We did not investigate 
all potential approaches to assessing causality (e.g. Inter-
national Agency for Research on Cancer and criteria for 
teratogenicity) due to limited time and resources. Instead, 
we focused on GRADE, DAGs and SCC models which 
are perhaps the best-known causal assessment approaches 
outside of BH viewpoints.
This study underscores the need for greater clarity on 
causal assessment in epidemiology. This is an initial attempt 
to demonstrate how recent approaches can be used to elu-
cidate BH viewpoints, which remain fundamental to causal 
assessment and to tentatively suggest how their application 
could be improved. Our findings are preliminary and we 
welcome debate about our comparisons and the suggested 
implications for causal assessment.
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